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NOTES AND COMMENTS

MATUSEVITCH v. TELNIKOFF: THE FIRST AMENDMENT
TRAVELS ABROAD, PREVENTING RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF A BRITISH LIBEL JUDGMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

With rapid advances in modern communications and technology,
the legal implications of the dissemination, publication and effects of
speech have become increasingly international. In Matusevitch v.
Telnikoffl the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (applying Maryland law) was faced with the issue of whether or
not to recognize a British libel judgment which did not incorporate
United States' constitutional First Amendment protections. The court
refused to recognize the judgment, thereby providing a clear impediment to forum shopping and affirming the United States' break with
British libel law. The court denied recognition under a discretionary
provision of Maryland's Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act ("Maryland's Recognition Act"), holding the judgment to be
repugnant to Maryland and United States public policy because British
defamation law lacks First Amendment protections.' By refusing to
recognize and enforce the British libel judgment, the District Court has
continued the national trend to apply United States defamation law
abroad, whether in an enforcement context or in a choice of law
context.
This Note initially reviews both the facts and reasoning of Matusevitch, discusses the principles of full faith and credit, comity and
reciprocity, and outlines the proper procedure to follow in Maryland to
recognize and enforce a foreign country's judgment as opposed to a
sister state's judgment. Next, this Note summarizes Maryland case law
regarding enforcement of other foreign country judgments in the context of public policy issues, and cases from other jurisdictions particu-

1. Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995).
2. Id. at 2, citing MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-701 - 10-709 (1995)
[hereinafter Maryland's Recognition Act].

(225)
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larly discussing foreign libel actions. Specific comparison is made with
Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications Inc.,' the only other case to
deal directly with this same issue. This Note concludes that while the
District Court protected the American press under the discretionary
public policy exception, it could have grounded its decision in the
mandatory constitutional due process exception to recognition of foreign country judgments. This Note also suggests that there would be
more certainty if non-First Amendment foreign libel judgments were
never recognized in Maryland.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Facts

Telnikoff was a prominent human rights activist in the Soviet
Union for nearly forty years, who then emigrated to England where he
was employed by the BBC's Russian service. 4 This case originated after
he published an article in the Daily Telegraph discussing the Russian
personnel that Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty had hired.5 In his article of February 13, 1984, Telnikoff emphasized the importance of distinguishing between "Communist" and "Russian," and stated, inter
alia:
This confusion further manifests itself in the policy of recruitment for the Russian Service. While other services are
staffed almost exclusively from those who share the ethnic origin of the people to whom they broadcast, the Russian Service
is recruited almost entirely from Russian-speaking national minorities of the Soviet empire, and has something like 10 per
cent. [sic] of those who associate themselves ethnically, spiritually or religiously with Russian people. However high the standards and integrity of that majority there is no more logic in
this than having a Greek Service which is 90 per cent. [sic]
recruited from the Greek-speaking Turkish community of
Cyprus. 6
Matusevitch, also a Russian emigr6, who was then employed in
London by the United States radio station Radio Liberty, took offense
at Telnikoff's statements. On February 18, 1984, Matusevitch (the

3.
4.
5.
6.

585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 5.
Id.
Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 4 All E.R. 817, 819-20 (Q.B. 1991).
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Plaintiff in the U.S. case) published a response to Telnikoff's original
article in the Daily Telegraph. In his article, Matusevitch claimed that
there is only one culture in Russia, namely Russian, and that the Defendant advocated racial policies.' Furthermore, Matusevitch wrote
"Mr. Telnikoff demands that in the interest of more effective broadcasts the management of the BBC's Russian Service should switch
from professional testing to a blood test."
Telnikoff filed suit against Matusevitch in England, claiming that
Matusevitch defamed him in his response. Telnikoff won a judgment on
March 16, 1992, for £240,000.00 Sterling. 9 Telnikoff then filed this
British judgment with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Montgomery
County, Maryland in order to enforce and collect that judgment, 10 pursuant to Maryland's Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
("Maryland's Enforcement Act").
After having the case transferred from the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland, 2 Matusevitch filed a motion for
summary judgment with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia based on federal question jurisdiction.' 3 Matusevitch
sought to preclude enforcement and collection of the British libel judgment as both an unrecognized and unrecognizable judgment. "
B.

Issues and Holding

While Maryland's Enforcement Act provides for a simple filing

7. Id. at 820.
8. Id.
9. Order of the High Court of Justice, Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 4 All E.R. 817
(Q.B. 1991) (1984-T-No. 964).
10. Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 3. This was done because Matusevitch was a
resident of Maryland. Declaration of Counsel Registering Foreign Judgment at 1, Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. 1 (No. 94-1151 RMU).
11. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 11-801 - 11-807 (1987) [hereinafter
Maryland's Enforcement Act].
12. Unopposed Motion to Transfer Venue, Matusevitch (granted May,
1994)(C.A. No. 94-1151-RCL).
13. Ordinarily, recognition and enforcement of judgments from foreign countries
are issues of state law, not federal law, unless a specific federal statute, treaty, or other
basis for federal jurisdiction exists. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 cmt. a (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)]. In the instant case, there was diversity of citizenship, Matusevitch being a
resident of Maryland, and Telnikoff being a British citizen. Declaration of Counsel
Registering Foreign Judgment at 1. However, jurisdiction was conferred under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 as a federal question regarding federal civil rights violation. Civil Cover
Sheet at 1, Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. 1 (No. 94-1151 RMU).
14. Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. 1.
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procedure for a recognized foreign country judgment, that judgment
must first pass the recognition threshold, as set forth in Maryland's
Recognition Act.16 Telnikoffs judgment failed to meet this threshold
on both procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, Telnikoff
did not have the British libel judgment judicially recognized before it
was filed. 16 Substantively, the court would not recognize this British
libel judgment because it was repugnant to both Maryland and United
17
States law.
The District Court refused to recognize this judgment because, in
contrast with the United States, Great Britain's libel case standards do
not ensure First and Fourteenth Amendment protections to libel defendants. 8 The court concluded that there are four major differences
between British and United States libel law. First, in England a defendant bears the burden of proving the veracity of the allegedly defamatory statements, whereas in the United States a plaintiff bears the
burden of proving their falsity.1 9 Second, hyperbolic speech, as claimed
here, receives protection under the Constitution's First Amendment.2 0
Third, United States' courts, in contrast to British courts, evaluate the
context in which the allegedly defamatory statements appeared when
adjudicating libel issues. 1 And last, under New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,2 2 a United States plaintiff who is a public figure must show
that the defendant published the defamatory remarks with actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.2 3 This contrasts with the United
Kingdom, where the defendant's state of mind or intention is irrelevant,
as malice is presumed.2 4
The court determined that Telnikoff, the Defendant in the instant
case (who initially was the plaintiff in England) was a prominent
human rights activist, and therefore a limited public figure. 25 Hence,

15. Maryland's Recognition Act, supra note 2.
16. Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 2.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2 & n.2.
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id. at 4 (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Old
Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264
(1974); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970)).
21. Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 4-5 (citing Moldea v. New York Times Co., 22
F.3d 310, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Furthermore, the British court specifically instructed
the jury to ignore the context. Id. at 5.
22. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
23. Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 5.
24. Id. at 4.

25. Id. at 5.
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the Plaintiff was entitled to United States constitutional and New York
Times protections regarding speech against public personalities.2 6 Since
English law denied Plaintiff his constitutional protections, the judgment
was contrary to United States and Maryland public policy. The court
refused to recognize British libel law on legal principles, without a
thorough discussion of the facts of the case. This implies a blanket rejection of the foreign law.
While the court clearly raised the issue of the lack of both First
and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional shields,2 7 it based its holding on the discretionary exception to recognizing a foreign country
judgment as an affront to state and national public policy.2 8 Although
the court briefly mentioned this additional ground, it did not explicitly
base its holding on the mandatory exception for recognizing a foreign
country judgment where there is a violation of due process. 9
III.

LEGAL CONTEXT

A.

Overview

The world is increasingly becoming one global market for communications, with published materials travelling instantaneously to all four
corners of the globe via satellite, television, printed materials and computer networks."0 In contrast, the legal systems of the world have not
become one global market. This becomes particularly problematic
when published material is distributed in more than one country, each

26. Id. at 6.
27.
Because recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, based on libel
standards that are repugnant to the public policies of the State of Maryland
and the United States, would deprive the plaintiff of his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, the court grants summary judgment for the plaintiff as a
matter of law.
id. at 2.
28. "Therefore, pursuant to section 10-704(b)(2) of the Recognition Act, this
court declines to recognize the foreign judgment." Id. at 4. Section 10-704(b)(2) of the
Maryland Recognition Act says that "[a] foreign judgment need not be recognized if
. . . [t]he cause of action on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public
policy of the State."
29. Section 10-704(a)(1) of the Maryland Recognition Act says that "[a] foreign
judgment is not conclusive if. . .[tihe judgment was rendered under a system which
does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of
due process of law."
30. One court even envisioned extraterrestrial publication! Desai v. Hersh, 719 F.
Supp. 670, 677 (N.D. I11.
1989), aff'd on other grounds, 954 F.2d 1408 (7th Cir.
1992).
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with different standards for libel. The situation arises when an author
or publisher purposefully distributes material in a foreign market but
also when material unintentionally reaches distant markets.
United States courts are struggling with the issue of conflicting
libel standards in two specific contexts. First, litigants may disagree
over the choice of law to be applied in a libel suit filed in the United
States. 31 Usually the choice is between the law of the forum state or
the law of the place of the wrong (the lex loci delicti). This is further
complicated because with respect to reputation, it is not always easy to
ascertain where the wrong took place and often the injury extends to
more than one jurisdiction. 2
Second, United States courts may be called upon to recognize and
enforce a libel judgment that was rendered abroad. Both Matusevitch
v. Telnikoffl3 and Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications,Inc. 4 faced
this issue regarding the enforcement of an English common law libel
judgment through a United States court.
While United States law was founded on the English common law,
the Constitution and Bill of Rights were adopted specifically to afford
Americans greater rights than they had possessed under British colonial law.35 More recently, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan" signified a
revolutionary diversion from English defamation law, relaxing the
stricter liability of the common law.3" Unlike the United States, many
countries still follow English common law with respect to libel. 3 8
"[A]ny libel law that does not require proof of fault and falsity is in
direct conflict with the First Amendment. Under that interpretation,
the libel laws of almost the entire world are unconstitutional in
America." 39

31. DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., Inc., 83 F.R.D. 574 (D. Haw. 1979); Desai, 719 F.
Supp. 670. See discussion infra part IV.
32. See DeRoburt, 83 F.R.D. at 577-78 (discussing the place of greatest injury).
33. 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995).
34. 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
35. Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 4 n.2. See also Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
36. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
37. New York Times shifted the burden of proof from defendant to plaintiff, and
introduced the requirement of fault, through the "actual malice" rule. Kyo Ho Youm,
Suing American Media in Foreign Courts: Doing an End-Run Around U.S. Libel
Law?, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 235, 239-40 (1994).
38. For instance, both Nauru and India follow English defamation law, derived
1989).
from the common law. Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670, 675 (N.D. Ill.
39. Youm, supra note 37, at 259 (quoting Todd F. Simon & Tuen-yu Lau, When
Systems Collide: Trial of Foreign Communist Media in U.S. Courts 15 (Aug. 1987)
(research paper presented at the annual convention of the Association for Education in
Journalism and Mass Communication in San Antonio, Tex.)).
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The First Amendment and protections of speech established in
New York Times encourage plaintiffs to avoid United States courts and
file abroad where possible.4 0 Foreign courts may represent a plaintiff's
only chance for a successful judgment. 4 In particular, England has become "'the libel capital of the world, as foreign public figures queue' to
claim damages for reputational injury that cannot be won at home."4' 2
Especially in comparison to United States' standards, an English suit is
almost a sure win for plaintiffs.
For large organizations, such as international publications, the
chance to contest a foreign libel judgment in the United States rarely
arises because they usually have significant assets in the country rendering the judgment, and are therefore subject to enforcement proceedings in the same jurisdiction. 3 In contrast, an individual author who
publishes in one country is less likely to have published in other countries as well, and if she has, is less likely to have analyzed carefully
that nation's libel laws. Once published abroad, chances are the author's assets are mostly, if not exclusively, located in the home country.
Hence, those particularly exposed to a judgment in one jurisdiction and
collection proceedings in another are individuals and small companies
who are not apt to have substantial assets abroad from which to pay a
judgment. Ironically, these parties probably have the least amount of
resources and legal knowledge available to cater to different legal
standards.
This lack of a uniform international legal standard can have a
chilling effect on United States media. If foreign libel standards can be
applied to domestically published material, publishers will either print
different versions for different countries, or will carefully constrain
their articles in order to pass scrutiny under the jurisdiction with the

40.
The increase in communication due to advanced technology has led to more
complex defamation litigation. For example, the plaintiffs and defendants
may be domiciled in more than one country or the defamatory broadcast may

be received in several countries. The plaintiff in a defamation action may
therefore have a group of countries from which to choose a forum.
Youm, supra note 37, at 255, (quoting Kimberly Richards, Defamation Via Modern
Communication: Can Countries Preserve Their Traditional Policies?
LAW. 613, 615 (1990)).

3

TRANSNAT'L

41. Volker Behr, Symposium On U.S.-E.C. Legal Relations, Enforcement of
United States Money Judgments in Germany, 13 J.L. & COM. 211, 214.

42. Youm, supra note 37, at 254, (quoting Geoffrey Robertson, Two Cheers for
the First Amendment, 9 COMM.

LAW.

Spring 1991, at 6, 8).

43. Youm, supra note 37, at 260-61.
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most restrictive laws." While a publication or broadcast may be intended solely for the domestic market, oftentimes it either actually ends
up being distributed abroad, or its effects travel abroad, thereby creating the possibility of international liability, without the author's intent
or consent. For instance, a posting in cyberspace may end up on a computer screen anywhere in the world, or a publication can be resold
abroad unbeknownst to the author.
The United States is therefore faced with a precarious balancing
act between applying our constitutional norms extraterritorially or
causing a chilling effect on speech that has any chance of travelling
abroad. While applying our legal standards to foreign judgments may
protect United States nationals, it could cause retaliation from foreign
countries if they, in turn, refuse to enforce American judgments, citing
a lack of reciprocity. On the other hand, if we recognize foreign libel
judgments, plaintiffs are then able to skirt United States legal standards and the media will have to tailor their publications to the highest
common international denominator. While the Supreme Court has decided whether certain constitutional guarantees apply abroad, 4" the
Court has yet to decide whether the First Amendment applies abroad
46
to either nationals or aliens.
B.

Full Faith & Credit, Comity & Reciprocity

Since Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 47 and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Manufacturing Co.,4" federal courts have consistently held
that in the absence of a federal treaty or statute, state law governs the
recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments.4 9 While

44. Jeremy Maltby, Juggling Comity and Self-Government: The Enforcement of
Foreign Libel, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1978, 2007-08 (1994).
45. Id. at 2013 & n.184 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (American
citizens tried before a military tribunal abroad are entitled to Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990)
(aliens abroad are not entitled to Fourth Amendment protections)).
46. Maltby, supra note 44, at 2013-14.
47. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
48. 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (stating that state conflict-of-laws rules are applied by
federal courts when sitting under diversity jurisdiction as per Erie).
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 481 cmt. a. See also Ronald A.
Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In Search of
Uniformity and InternationalAcceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 262 & n.31
(1991) (citing Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 100304 (5th Cir. 1990); Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Somportex,
Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009,
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state law is not uniform, money judgments can only be enforced by a
civil action once local jurisdiction is obtained, and only against assests
located within that jurisdiction.50 In determining the status of foreign
country judgments, state law, whether judicial or statutory, is usually
based on one of three rules : (1) full faith and credit; (2) reciprocity; or

(3) comity.51
Under the United States Constitution, normally full faith and
credit is only applied to judgments from sister states 2 and other federal courts.53 Maryland does not apply full faith and credit to foreign
country judgments.54 Under this doctrine, enforcement of a sister state
judgment can only be refused when the judgment was initially rendered
without one of the following three safeguards: inadequate notice, lack

of personal jursidiction or lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 55
The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1964 (the

"Uniform Enforcement Act"),5" which implements the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution of the United States," allows for recognition of sister state judgments and judgments of United States fed-

1011-12 (E.D. Ark. 1973)). Because actions to enforce a foreign country judgment
usually involve international litigants, many such actions are brought to federal court
under diversity of citizenship. Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332, and usually cases which involve the enforcement of foreign judgments arise
under this provision. However, jurisdiction can also arise under "federal question jurisdiction" as per 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Such cases include admiralty law, 28 U.S.C. § 1333,
bankruptcy law, 28 U.S.C. § 1334, and copyright and patent law, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
Brand at 262 & n.32.
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13 § 481 cmt. g; FTC v. Compagnie de
Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
51. Brand, supra note 49, at 264-65.
52. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1, and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 which implements this constitutional provision.
53. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1, and 28 U.S.C. § 1963. Once finalized by appeal and
registered, a federal judgment is recognizable in any other United States District
Court. Id. However, some states treat foreign country judgments in a similar fashion,
enforcing them under the doctrine of full faith and credit. Brand, supra note 49, at 265
(citing Atlantic Ship Supply, Inc. v. M/V Lucy, 392 F. Supp. 179, 183 (M.D. Fla.
1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1977) (recognizing judgment from Costa Rica
under both the doctrines of comity and of full faith and credit)).
54. Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 883 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting S.A.
Andes v. Versant Corp., 878 F.2d 147, 150 (4th Cir. 1989)).
55. Maltby, supra note 44, at 1984 & n.21.
56. UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT § 13 U.L.A. 152
(Westlaw 1995) [hereinafter Uniform Enforcement Act].
57. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1 (referred to in Van Kooten Holding B.V. v.
Dumarco Corp. 670 F. Supp. 227, 228 (N.D. Il. 1987)).
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eral courts.58 However, the Uniform Enforcement Act alone also does
not usually apply to foreign country judgments, 59 as it defines a foreign
judgment as "any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United
States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in
this state." 60
In contrast, the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition
Act of 1962 (the "Uniform Recognition Act"), 6 1 defines a foreign judg-

ment differently, as "any judgment of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, other than a judgment for taxes, a fine
or other penalty, or a judgment for support in matrimonial or family
matters. ' 62 Therefore, if a foreign country judgment is recognized in
any state (e.g., under the state's Recognition Act), then it is entitled to
full faith and credit as provided for in the state's Enforcement Act. 68

58. But see Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Panelfab Int'l Corp., 501 So. 2d
167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a judgment rendered by the United States
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico was not a state court judgment, and
therefore not recognizable under Florida's Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act). To
date, 46 states have enacted an Enforcement Act. For a list of specific statutory citations, see Uniform Enforcement Act, supra note 56.
59. See Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190 (1912) (holding
that foreign country judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit); Guinness PLC
v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 891 (4th Cir. 1992) (concluding that Maryland's Enforcement
Act is inapplicable to foreign country judgments but for the adoption of Maryland's
Recognition Act); Hennessy v. Marshall, 682 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984);
Biel v. Boehm, 406 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
60. Uniform Enforcement Act, supra note 56 § 1. Maryland's Enforcement Act is
substantially the same, defining a "foreign judgment" as "a judgment, decree, or order
of a court of the United States or of any other court that is entitled to full faith and
credit in this State." Maryland Enforcement Act, supra note 11 § 11-801. See also
Van Kooten Holding B.V., 670 F. Supp. at 227-28, (stating that the purpose of the
Uniform Enforcement Act is to "facilitate the enforcement of interstate judgments").
61. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 13 U.L.A. 263
§ 1(2) (Westlaw 1995) [hereinafter Uniform Recognition Act].
62. Uniform Recognition Act, supra note 61 § 1(2). Again, Maryland's Recognition Act is virtually the same as the Uniform Recognition Act, defining "foreign judgment" as "any judgment of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of
money. It does not mean a judgment for taxes, fine, or penalty, or a judgment for
support in matrimonial or family matters." Maryland Recognition Act, supra note 2
§ 10-701(b). Some states make this point clearer by referring to a "foreign country"
judgment as opposed to a "foreign" judgment in their Recognition Acts. N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & R. 5302 (McKinney 1995); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 36.002 (West 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-465.8 (Michie 1995).
63. If one has doubts about obtaining recognition of a foreign country judgment in
a particular state's jurisdiction, it is wise to obtain recognition first, where possible, in a
state with a Uniform Recognition Act. Once recognized properly, the judgment would
then be entitled to full faith and credit in all fifty states, as a sister state judgment.
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While foreign country judgments are usually not entitled to direct
recognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, they can be recognized under the flexible notion of comity, although sometimes limited
by the requirement of reciprocity. Any discussion of comity and reciprocity begins with the seminal case of Hilton v. Guyot" which sets
forth a detailed discussion of the two intertwined doctrines.
In Hilton, the United States Supreme Court refused to afford a
conclusive effect to a judgment obtained in a French court by a French
company against two United States citizens who had conducted business in France. 6 The Court held that reciprocity by French courts is
required before the United States would afford this French judgment
full faith and credit, because "international law is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity." 66 While not attaching full faith and credit to the
French judgment, the Court held that such a foreign country judgment
would be "prima facie evidence only of the justice of the plaintiffs'
67
claim."
In denying the $277,775.44 judgment, the Court reasoned that
France, faced with a similar claim for recognition from a United States
court, would have completely reviewed a judgment on its merits, and
therefore not afforded it "full credit and conclusive effect."6 8 Because
of this lack of reciprocity, the Supreme Court refused to afford the
French judgment full credit and conclusive effect.6 9
Before reaching the final results, Justice Gray explained the doctrine of comity when there is no treaty explicity governing the specific
issue.7 0 Summarizing how laws only have effect within the limits of
national sovereignty, he set forth an often quoted definition of "the
comity of nations" as:
'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international

Friedrich Juenger, An International Transaction in the American Conflict of Laws, 7
FLA. J. INT'L L. 383, 398-99 (1992).
64. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
65. Id.

66. Id. at 228.
67. Id. at 227.

68. Id.

69. Id.
70. Id. at 163.
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duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of
71
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
While never explicity overruled, Hilton's reciprocity requirement
is not currently required in the majority of United States jurisdictions.7 2 However, seven states do include reciprocity in their Recognition Acts: in Massachussets and Georgia, lack of reciprocity is a
mandatory reason for nonrecognition; 73 in Idaho, Florida, North Carolina, Ohio and Texas, lack of reciprocity is a discretionary reason for
nonrecognition. 74 The trend is to abandon the reciprocity requirement
since many jurisdictions think it unfairly and irrationally penalizes individual litigants. 5
In contrast, most European jurisdictions still require reciprocity. 6
While the United States is not currently a party to any multinational
treaties regarding recognition or enforcement of foreign country judgments, 77 much of Europe, as well as Latin America, is covered by such

71. Id. at 163-64. See also, Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C.
1995).

72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13 § 481 cmt. d. See also, inter alia, Bank
of Montreal v. Kough, 612 F.2d 467, 472 (9th Cir. 1980); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 & n.8 (3rd Cir. 1971) ("The doctrine [of
reciprocity] has received no more than desultory acknowledgement."); Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009, 1013-14 (E.D. Ark. 1973). Furthermore, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cites the draftsmen of the Uniform Recognition Act as having purposefully rejected reciprocity as a consideration,
because the due process requirements were enough of a safeguard for United States
citizens sued on foreign country judgments. Bank of Montreal, 612 F.2d at 471-72
(citing Transcript, "Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, Uniform Recognition of
Foreign-Money Judgments Act," Aug. 5, 1961, at 8-9). Interestingly enough, the
draftsmen contrasted their version with the British statute for recognition of foreign
country judgments which requires reciprocity but not due process. Bank of Montreal,
612 F.2d at 472 n.6.
73. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-114(10) (1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 235,
§ 23A (West 1994).
74. IDAHO CODE § 10-1404(2)(g) (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.605(2)(g) (West
1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1C-1804(b)(7) (West 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2329.92(B) (West 1995); TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(7)
(West 1993). See also, Royal Bank of Canada v. Trentham Corp., 665 F.2d 515 (5th
Cir. 1981). In New Hampshire, reciprocity is required only for Canadian judgments.
N.H. REY. STAT. ANN. § 524:11 (1994), as noted in Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862,

868 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
75. Behr, supra note 41, at 221.
76. Id. at 220.
77. In the 1970's, Great Britain and the United States did hold negotiations regarding a proposed Convention Providing for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters; however, those negotiations were terminated with-
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treaties.78
Because many other countries require either a treaty or reciprocity
before recognizing a judgment from a foreign country, the fact that the
United States does not have a uniform federal law in this area makes it
difficult for an American litigant to satisfy foreign reciprocity requirements."9 Although the United States is one of the most liberal countries
in terms of recognizing foreign country judgments,"0 an explicit treaty
and/or policy would lead to more certainty." Indeed, the Uniform
Recognition Act's purpose was "'to create greater recognition of the
state's judgments in foreign nations . . .by informing the foreign nations of particular situations in which their judgments would definitely
be recognized.' "82 However, this Act has not been adopted by every

out an agreement. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, Introductory Note 1.
However, see Vagenas v. Continental Gin Co., 988 F.2d 104, 106 (1lth Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 389 (1993) (construing an article in a United States-Greece
treaty as elevating a Greek judgment to that of a sister state judgment), and Choi v.
Kim, 50 F.3d 244, 248 (3rd Cir. 1995) (construing a similar provision in a United
States-Korea treaty as also elevating a Korean judgment to the status of a sister state
judgment).
78. Most of the European Community states and the European Free Trade Association member states are governed by the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32,
reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1417 (consolidated and updated text) and the Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620. See Behr, supra note 41, at 213. In
Latin America, there is, for instance, the Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards of 1979. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 13, § 481 Reporter's note 6.
79. Behr, supra note 41, at 223. "Recent German commentators on the Code of
Civil Procedure, who despair that it is necessary to review more than fifty state jurisdictions to determine the U.S. position, conclude [however] that reciprocity is generally
guaranteed in the United States." Id.
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, Introductory Note.
It appears that the country most receptive to recognition of foreign judgments
is the United States, in which the principles and practices engendered by the
Full Faith and Credit clause in the United States Constitution in respect of
sister-State judgments have to a large extent been carried over to recognition
and enforcement of judgments of foreign states.
Id.
81. Behr, supra note 41, at 223; Matthew H. Adler, If We Build It, Will They
Come? - The Need For a Multilateral Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Monetary Judgments, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 79, 80 (1994).
82. Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 884 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Bank of
Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp. 1243, 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 612 F.2d 467
(9th Cir. 1980)).
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state, nor uniformly when so adopted. 83 In the absence of a single national standard, American litigants who find themselves in a foreign
country's jurisdiction are left to the domestic laws of that nation.
While neither the Uniform Enforcement Act nor the Full Faith
and Credit Clause alone give effect to judgments from foreign countries, Maryland is one of twenty-three states that have enacted some
version of both the Uniform Enforcement Act and the Uniform Recognition Act to date. 84 Pursuant to the Uniform Recognition Act, and
subject to many exceptions and conditions, a foreign country judgment
for the payment of a sum of money "is enforceable in the same manner
as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and
credit."8 5 Hence, the Recognition Act in conjunction with the Enforcement Act provide means by which a judgment from a foreign country
may be enforced in the United States with full faith and credit, as if it
were a sister state judgment. The twenty-three states that have enacted
some form of both Acts provide the clearest guidance on obtaining enforcement of a foreign country judgment on United States territory.
This clarity is important, both for reciprocity and certainty. Furthermore, "[m]any of the reasons for recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments are the same as for giving conclusive effect to
domestic judgments: prevention of harassment of the successful party,
elimination of duplicative judicial proceedings, and providing some
measure of settled expectations to the parties." ' 6
C. Public Policy Exception
Most nations will not enforce a judgment rendered abroad if it
offends their domestic public policy. 87 In the United States, the Supreme Court has ruled that comity "does not require, but rather for-

83. To date, 26 states have adopted a Recognition Act. For a list of specific statutory citations, see Uniform Recognition Act, supra note 61, at Table of Jurisdictions
Wherein Act Has Been Adopted.
84. Maryland's Enforcement Act, supra note 11 and Maryland's Recognition Act,
supra note 2. The 23 jurisdictions that have enacted versions of both acts to date are as
follows: Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virgin Islands, Virginia, and Washington. For a list of specific statutory citations, see Uniform Enforcement Act, supra note
56, and Uniform Recognition Act, supra note 61, at their respective Tables of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted.
85. Uniform Recognition Act, supra note 61, § 3.
86. Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885, 905 (N.D. Tex.
1980).
87. Behr, supra note 41, at 211. All European nations follow this. Id.
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bids [recognition] where such a recognition works a direct violation of
the policy of our laws, and does violence to what we deem the rights of
our citizens," 88 and individual states will not enforce a judgment that
violates U.S. public policy. 9
The problem is in defining what offends public policy. Such a definition is inherently imprecise and depends on the specific jurisdiction.
The public policy exception to comity has generally been construed
narrowly90 for a number of reasons. First, statutorily, the Recognition
Act provides many specific grounds, such as lack of due process or lack
of jurisdiction, for nonrecognition and hence few judgments fall outside
of these categories. 9 1 In addition, "[a]s Judge Cardozo so lucidly observed: 'We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a
problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home.' 92
To succeed on public policy grounds, there must be an overriding
public interest which outweighs comity principles; "mere variance with
local public policy is not sufficient to decline enforcement." 93 The standard for denying recognition is high and can only be invoked in clearcut cases. 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
applied the following public policy test for declining enforcement of a
foreign country judgment when it
tends clearly to injure the public health, the public morals, the
public confidence in the purity of the administration of the law,
or to undermine that sense of security for individual rights,
whether of personal liberty or of private property, which any
95
citizen ought to feel, is against public policy.

88. Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1995) (citing Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 193 (1895) (quoting De Brimont v. Penniman, 10 F. Cas. 436,
441 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 3,715)).

89. Individual states tend not to enforce such judgments under either their individual Recognition Act, or under § 4(b)(3) of the Uniform Recognition Act (discretionary), supra note 61, or under § 482(2)(d) of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) (also discretionary), supra note 13, or under state common law.
90. David Westin, Enforcing Foreign Commercial Judgments and Arbitral
Awards in the United States, West Germany, and England, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 325, 337 (1987).
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, Reporter's note 1.
92. Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 842 (2nd Cir. 1986) (quoting Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 110-11 (1918)).
93. Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 842.
94. Id. at 841 (citations omitted).
95. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 443 (3rd
Cir. 1971) (quoting and aff'g Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318
F. Supp. 161, 169 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (quoting Goodyear v. Brown, 155 Pa. 514, 518
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The fact that a judgment obtained abroad could not have been obtained domestically, or even that a cause of action pursued abroad
could not be invoked in the United States jurisdiction is insufficient to
deny enforcement on public policy grounds. 96 Logistically, most differences in law are covered by other provisions of the Uniform Recognition Act. However, when not so covered, for reciprocity concerns, certainty in judgments and international cooperation, it is important to
narrow the public policy exception, as otherwise any differences in law
could fall under its ambit.
As commerce becomes increasingly international in character, it is essential that businessmen recognize and respect the
laws of those foreign nations in which they do business. They
cannot expect foreign tribunals to have one set of laws for their
own citizens and another, more favorable, set for the citizens of
other countries. It is also essential that American courts recognize and respect the judgments entered by foreign courts to the
greatest extent consistent with our own ideals of justice and fair
play. Unfettered trade, good will among nations, and a vigorous
and stable international-and national-economy demand no
less.

7

As stated so eloquently in Tahan, above, the principles of international
harmony, comity and res judicata justify such a limited reading of this
recognition exception.98
Courts have been called upon to examine the limited public policy
exception in a number of areas. For example, a number of cases have
dealt with attorneys' fees which were incurred abroad, under foreign
standards. In 1986, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that in the absence of "fraud, overreaching or bad faith,"
differences in the German fee structure for attorneys did not, in and of
itself, violate New York public policy. 99 An English breach of contract
action which permits compensatory damages for loss of goodwill and
other costs, including legal fees, was held not to violate Pennsylvania's

(1893))).
96. See, e.g., Knothe v. Rose, 392 S.E.2d 570 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Neporany v.
Kir, 5 A.D.2d 438 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958).
97. Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
98. See Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 845.
99. Id. (holding the judgment enforceable in general, however disallowing portion
of attorney's bill for which there was no evidence of prior authorization or of a tangible
work product).
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public policy, even though unrecoverable there. 100 An unsuccessful litigant in Mexico claimed that charging him with his opponent's attorney's fees violated Texas public policy. The Texas court held that the
Mexican attorney's fees and costs were enforceable, even if they could
not have been granted by an American court.10 1
0
With respect to other areas, in Tahan v. Hodgson"'
enforcement
of a default judgment rendered in Israel against the defendent was held
not to violate the District of Columbia's public policy, even though
Israel's notice provisions were different from the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.103 In Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 04 an Eng-

lish grant of prejudgment interest was allowed on a sum for recovery
that was uncertain before the time of judgment, even though Texas law
was not in accord.' 0 5 Similarly, a Canadian judgment was held enforceable even though note holders have broader powers with respect to se-

curity in Canada than in Arkansas.

06

Another Canadian judgment was

also upheld which was based on two causes of action, seduction and
criminal conversation, both of which had been abolished in New
York.'0 7 In Ackerman v. Ackerman, 08 the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Second Circuit upheld an English judgment for enforcement of a breach of separation agreement under New York law. What

100. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 443 (3rd
Cir. 1971).
101. Compania Mexicana Rediodifusora [sic] Franteriza v. Spann, 41 F. Supp.
907 (N.D. Tex. 1941), aff'd 131 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1942).
102. 662 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
103. Id.
With respect to the fact that Israeli procedure was inconsistent with Rule
55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we think that it would be a
mistake to find failure to follow the Federal Rules by a foreign nation to be
ipso facto a violation of American public policy. It would be unrealistic for
the United States to require all foreign judicial systems to adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Obviously, all foreign judgments will be inconsistent to some extent with the Federal Rules; many state court judgments
are, for that matter. Surely a more important discrepancy than this is necessary to create a violation of public policy. We do not find the Israeli court's
failure to provide second notice three days prior to hearing an application for
entry of default to be so "repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent
and just" that American public policy requires non-enforcement of the subsequent judgment.
Id. at 866.
104. 492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
105. Id. at 901.
106. Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
107. Neporany v. Kir, 5 A.D.2d 438 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958).
108. 676 F.2d 898 (2nd Cir. 1982).
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is unusual about this case is that there was a California judgment dismissing the English decision to which New York would not give full
faith and credit. Hence, "no antecedent judgment stands in the way of
enforcing the English judgment . .. ."I"
In contrast, a Luxembourg judgment that calculated a bankrupt
company's United States federal income tax debt at less than two hundred thousand dollars, when the Internal Revenue Service claimed it
was a million dollars, was held to violate the "inexpugnable public policy that favors payment of lawfully owed federal income taxes."11 0 In
addition, courts are beginning to refuse to recognize libel judgments
obtained in contravention of the United States Constitution's First
Amendment. For a complete discussion, see Section IV, below.
D.

Enforcing a Foreign Country Judgment in Maryland
1.

Process

As discussed in Matusevitch, while Maryland's Enforcement Act
provides a simple filing procedure for a judgment entitled to full faith
and credit, it does not allow for automatic enforcement of a foreign
country judgment. " ' However, it is "a facilitating device,"1 1 2 allowing
for simple enforcement proceedings once that judgment has been judicially recognized under Maryland's Recognition Act, for then it is also
entitled to full faith and credit. The two Acts are complementary and
not mutually exclusive."' However, it is important to distinguish between the two steps, " 4 because enforcement and recognition serve different purposes. " " While recognition is a prerequisite to enforcement of

109. Id. at 905.
110. Overseas Inns S.A. P.A. v. United States, 685 F. Supp. 968, 972 (N.D. Tex.
1988).
111. Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1995).
112. Weiner v. Blue Cross of Md., Inc., 730 F. Supp. 674, 676 (D. Md. 1990),
afd, Weiner v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Md., Inc., 925 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 816 (1991).
113. Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 891 (4th Cir. 1992).
114. Matusevitch highlights the adverse results when the steps are not applied
properly. As discussed above, enforcement was improperly sought before recognition
was obtained. While in this instance the foreign country judgment was held to be
never-the-less unrecognizable, the case did not discuss the results if the same situation
were to happen with a judgment that was entitled to recognition. Matusevitch, 877 F.
Supp. 1.
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13 § 481 cmt. b. See also, Guinness, 955
F.2d at 889 n.9 (distinguishing between questions of recognition and questions of
enforcement).
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a foreign country judgment, enforcement need not be sought nor is it
necessary for recognition. Recognition can be used in cases regardless
of whether enforcement is also sought, such as for res judicata, collateral estoppel, or for reliance on a prior determination of a fact or
law." 6 Furthermore, certain judgments which determine status, declare
rights, grant injunctions, or arise from attachment of property may be
recognized but not enforced."
Maryland's Recognition Act, effective June 1, 1963, " is set forth
in Maryland's Courts and Judicial Proceedings statute, § 10-701
through § 10-709." 9 To enforce a debt obtained from a foreign country
judgment, one must first obtain recognition of such judgment by filing
a civil action after establishing a basis of jurisdiction over the judgment
creditor or his property by the enforcing court. 2 0
It applies to "foreign judgment[s]" from a "foreign state," meaning "any governmental unit other than the United States, or any state,
district, commonwealth, territory, insular possession thereof, or the
Panama Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the
Ryukyu Islands."'' Conversely, it only applies to judgments from foreign countries, and has nothing to do with sister state judgments. 2'
Maryland's Recognition Act also applies to foreign judgments
which are "conclusive, and enforceable where rendered even though an
appeal is pending or it is subject to appeal."' 23 However, the court does
have discretion to stay the proceedings if an appeal is pending."2 Nine
reasons for not recognizing a foreign judgment are listed in § 10-704,
providing four mandatory grounds in section (a), and five discretionary
grounds in section (b) as follows:

116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13 § 481 cmt. b. See also, Guinness, 955
F.2d at 889 n.9.
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13 § 481 cmt. b.
118. Guinness, 955 F.2d at 883.
119. Maryland's Recognition Act, supra note 2.
120. Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1995) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13 § 481 cmt. g).
121. Maryland's Recognition Act, supra note 2 §§ 10-702, 10-701(c).
122. Mueller v. Payn, 352 A.2d 895, 900 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976).
123. Maryland's Recognition Act, supra note 2 § 10-702.
124. Id. § 10-706.
If the defendant satisfies the court either that an appeal is pending or that he
is entitled and intends to appeal from the foreign judgment, the court may
stay the proceedings until the appeal has been determined or until the expiration of a period of time sufficient to enable the defendant to prosecute the
appeal.
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Grounds for nonrecognition.
(a) A foreign judgment is not conclusive if:
(1) The judgment was rendered under a system
which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law; 2 '
(2) The foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant;
(3) The foreign court did not have jurisdiction over
the subject matter; or
(4) The judgment was obtained by fraud.
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if:
(1) The defendant in the proceedings in the foreign
court did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(2) The cause of action on which the judgment is
based is repugnant to the public policy of the State;
(3) The judgment conflicts with another final and
conclusive judgment;
(4) The proceeding in the foreign court was contrary
to an agreement between the parties under which the
dispute was to be settled out of court; or
(5) In the case of jurisdiction based only on personal
service, the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient
forum for the trial of the action.' 26
In addition, the Maryland Recognition Act lists non-exclusive bases of personal jurisdiction.117 Once a foreign judgment meets the Act's

requirements (with the exceptions as noted), that judgment "is conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or denies recovery
of a sum of money

. .

.[and] is enforceable in the same manner as the

judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and credit."' 28
A court also has the power to grant the foreign country judgment even

125. For a recent case denying enforcement of an Iranian judgment for lack of
due process under California's Foreign Money-Judgments Act see, Bank Melli Iran v.
Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406 (9th Cir. 1995)(holding there to be a lack of due process where
foreign tribunal did not afford defendant proper legal representation, a personal appearance in the forum or presentation of local witnesses on her behalf).
126. Maryland's Recognition Act, supra note 2 § 10-704.
127. Id. § 10-705.
128. Id. § 10-703.
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greater effect than required by this Act.12 9 While the court may not

grant it a lesser effect, it can and should grant it a greater effect when
to do so would be compatible with America's generally accepted substantive law. 180 Furthermore, Maryland's Recognition Act is not exclu-

sive, providing for an expansive, versus limited, interpretation." 1
Once a foreign country judgment has been properly recognized
under Maryland's Recognition Act, it is then "authenticated in accordance with an act of Congress or statutes of this State [Maryland],""3 2
and entitled to full faith and credit like a sister state judgment. 13 A
judgment creditor has the option of either bringing a separate action to
enforce that judgment or simply following the filing and notification
provisions set forth in Maryland's Enforcement Act, effective July 1,
1987.134

To file a recognized foreign-country judgment under Maryland's
Enforcement Act, a twenty-five dollar fee is required in addition to the
state's regular fees. 13 5 The "Filing" section sets forth which court is
proper depending on the amount of the judgment.3 6 The judgment
creditor must also file an affidavit with the last known addresses of both
himself or herself and the judgment debtor. 13 7 The clerk is then responsible for mailing notice to the judgment debtor. 138 However, the judg-

129. S.A. Andes v. Versant Corp., 878 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing the
Commissioner's Prefatory Note to the Uniform Recognition Act, supra note 61).
130. Id.
131. Maryland's Recognition Act, supra note 2 § 10-707. "This subtitle does not
prevent the recognition of a foreign judgment in situations not covered by this subtitle." Id. See also, Wolff v. Wolff, 389 A.2d 413, 416 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978), aff'd,
401 A.2d 479 (Md. 1979) (describing this subtitle as a "saving clause").
Despite the obscure wording of the clause, its intent is clear. The draftsmen
did not wish to fetter the requested court's power to recognize judgments
which fall Outside [sic] the scope of the Act; nor did they wish to discourage
the application of more liberal standards than those prescribed for judgments
Within [sic] its scope.

Id. (quoting A. Homburger, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments. A
New Yorker Reflects on Uniform Acts, 18 AM. J. COMp. L., 367, 370-71 (1970) (holding that an English divorce decree, including alimony, is recognizable under comity
despite the court's conclusion that Maryland's Recognition Act does not provide for
recognition or enforcement of alimony)).
132. Maryland's Enforcement Act, supra note 11 § 11-802(a).
133. Matusevitch v Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1995).
134. Maryland's Enforcement Act, supra note 11 § 11-805(b).
135. Id. § 11-805(a).
136. Id. § 11-802(a)(1).
137. Id. § 11-803(a).
138. Id. § 11-803(b). The clerk is also responsible for noting the mailing in the
docket. Id. § 11-803(b)(1).
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ment creditor also has the option to mail notice of the filing to the
judgment debtor, and proof of such will be enough if the court's clerk
did not mail the notice. 39
Maryland's Enforcement Act also provides for a mandatory stay
of enforcement of the judgment if the judgment debtor shows that an
appeal from that foreign judgment is either pending, will be made, or a
stay of execution has indeed been granted, and the judgment debtor
has furnished the necessary security for satisfaction of the foreign judgment as required where rendered. 40 A stay is also mandated if the
judgment debtor shows any other ground for which enforcement of the
judgment would be stayed in Maryland.'
Once filed with the appropriate court, the foreign judgment is to
be treated in the same fashion as a judgment rendered in that court,
and is subject to the same "procedures, defenses, and proceedings for
reopening, vacating, staying, enforcing, or satisfying as a judgment of
the court in which it is filed."' 42 The statute does not "purport to alter
any substantive rights or defenses that otherwise would be available
judgment debtor if suit were filed
either to the judgment creditor or the
' 43
to enforce that foreign judgment.'

By adopting both a Recognition Act and an Enforcement Act,
Maryland is one of twenty-three states that provides clear guidance on
how to translate a foreign country judgment into an enforceable American judgment.
2. Maryland Case Law
As discussed above in part 1., Maryland also provides means for
nonrecognition of a foreign country judgment that is "repugnant" to its
public policy by statute, although such denial is purely discretionary."44
Like other jurisdictions, Maryland construes the public policy exception
narrowly. Before Matusevitch, three cases in Maryland, Guinness PLC
v. Ward,' 5 S.A. Andes v. Versant Corp.,' 46 and Wolff v. Wolff, 4 7 ad-

139. Id. § 11-803(b)(3) and (4).
140. Id. § 11-804(a).
141. Id. § 11-804(b).
142. Id. § 11-802(a)(2) and (b).
143. Weiner v. Blue Cross of Md., 730 F. Supp. 674, 677 (D. Md. 1990) (holding
that a judgment debtor is entitled to remove an action to enforce a foreign judgment to
federal court under the same conditions as are permissible for other independent actions. "To conclude otherwise allows for the impermissible possibility that state procedural enactments alter federal policy on a state-by-state basis.")
144. Maryland's Recognition Act, supra note 2 § 10-704 (b)(2).
145. 955 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1992).
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dressed the recognition or enforcement of a foreign country judgment,
but only Guinness' 8 dealt with the public policy provision. However,
there have been other cases that discuss public policy with respect to
the application of a sister state's law in a choice of law context.14 9
In Guinness, a European corporation sought recognition and enforcement of a money judgment obtained in England. The defendant
claimed, inter alia, that recognition and enforcement of a British
breach-of-fiduciary-duty judgment (which did not take into account a
post-judgment settlement) "would be in direct contravention of Maryland's strong public policy favoring settlement of lawsuits." 150 The
court responded on a number of fronts. First, the court held that a
breach of fiduciary cause of action is not "repugnant to Maryland's
public policy" as it is a common and accepted cause of action in this
state.' 51 Next the court moved to an analysis of the post-judgment
settlement.
The Guinness court held that any defense available to the enforcement of a Maryland judgment, such as a post-judgment settlement, is
likewise available to a foreign country judgment.15 2 While allowing
such a defense in theory, the court nevertheless judicially estopped this
defendant from doing so. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted
that the defendant never notified the British court of the alleged settlement."' "The fact that the existence of such a settlement may affect
the judgment and its continuing effect does not change the reality that
such settlement is based on a separate cause of action which could not
have been litigated prior to judgment because of its nonexistence." '11 5
The court additionally clarified that contrary to what Ward claimed,
this argument was correctly categorized under §§ 10-702155 and 10-

146. 878 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that the "English rule of preclusion is
so much at odds with normal American notions of litigation that no American jurisdiction [including Maryland] would readily embrace it."). Id. at 150.
147. 389 A.2d 413 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978), aft'd, Wolff v. Wolff, 401 A.2d
479 (Md. 1979) (holding that alimony provisions of a foreign country divorce decree
may be recognized under Maryland's Recognition Act under principles of comity, even
though such judgments are technically excluded from the Act).
148. 955 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1992).
149. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas and Co., Inc., 498 A.2d 605 (Md.
1985); Harford Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bruchey, 238 A.2d 115 (Md. 1968); Linton v. Linton, 420 A.2d 1249 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980).
150. Guinness, 955 F.2d at 885.
151. Id. at 886.
152. Id. at 892 (citing Maryland's Recognition Act, supra note 2 § 10-703).
153. Guinness, 955 F.2d at 898.
154. Id. at 897-98.
155. Id. at 886 (regarding the finality of the judgment).
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703186 of Maryland's Recognition Act, and not the public policy
section.
The court also emphasized that the goals of the Maryland Recognition Act (namely "to achieve greater recognition of domestic judgments in foreign countries, i.e., reciprocity, by providing those countries
with notice of 'a minimum of [their] judgments which must be recognized in jurisdictions which have adopted the Act' ,,)157 would not be
achieved "if recognition courts were permitted to routinely expand the
bases for nonrecognition beyond those specifically enumerated in the
Act." 8 The court concluded that litigants - in principle - may raise
a post-judgment settlement with respect to the recognition of a foreign
country judgment just like a Maryland judgment. 159 However, for the
above mentioned reasons, that principle could not be invoked under the
circumstances in this particular case.""
The other Maryland cases which discuss public policy are with respect to choice of law. For example, the Maryland Court of Appeals
held that applying Virginia law, which does not recognize a claim for
loss of consortium, would not violate Maryland's public policy which
does recognize such recovery. 6 '
Similarly, in Linton v. Linton162 the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals had to decide whether or not to apply Virginia's law of no
interspousal immunity, the lex loci delicti of a motor vehicle accident,
in a Maryland court which did recognize interspousal immunity. In
reaching its results, the court defined public policy as
no more and no less than what is believed by the courts and the
legislature to be in the best interest of the citizens of this State.
Anything that tends to undermine or erode either the declared
health or moral
or the undeclared best interest of the general
63
welfare is said to be against public policy.

156. Id. at 889 (holding that a judgment debtor can raise a post-judgment settlement as a defense to the enforcement of a foreign country judgment, just like with a
sister state judgment).
157. Id. at 885, quoting Wolff v. Wolff, 389 A.2d 413, 417 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1978).
158. Guinness at 885.
159. Id. at 886.
160. Id. at 898.
161. Harford Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bruchey, 238 A.2d 115, 117-18 (Md. 1968)
(stating that there is a very high burden for rejecting foreign law on public policy
grounds).
162. 420 A.2d 1249 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980).
163. Id. at 1251.
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Applying this test, the court held that it would not violate Maryland's
public policy to apply the Virginia law, in that "the action is permitted
by the lex loci delicti[,] [o]ur public welfare, health, and morals will
not be endangered by allowing such suits to proceed to judgment[,]
[and] [t]here is little likelihood of an onslaught of similar litigation in
our courts. '6 4
So too, in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas and Co., 6 6 the
Court of Appeals discussed public policy in a conflict of laws context.
In deciding that applying a contract provision executed in Pennsylavania would violate Maryland public policy, the court rested its conclusion on an explicit contrary Maryland statute. In this case there was
a clear clash with Maryland's public policy because there was a statute
which said that "such indemnity provision 'is against public policy.' "166
Like other jurisdictions, Maryland requires that one overcome a
subtantial threshold before the court will recognize a conflict with public policy. Differences in law are not enough. However, it is much easier to cross that threshold where the legislature has expressly spoken.
In Bethlehem Steel, there was a clear statute indicating that the Pennylvania provision in question was contrary to public policy. So too, in
Matusevitch, the First Amendment clearly rejects British libel standards. As such, it was not difficult to conclude that British libel standards violate Maryland, as well as United States, public policy.
IV.

OTHER LIBEL CASES AND FOREIGN LAW

Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, there have been very few
cases which analyze a foreign law with respect to a libel cause of action. The first two cases, DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., Inc. 6" and Desai v.
Hersh,6 8 both deal with choice of law issues. While these cases do not
involve a foreign country judgment, they do provide valuable insights
into American public policy with respect to British libel law.
In DeRoburt, the President of Nauru filed suit in a United States
District Court (under diversity of citizenship) against an American
publisher and its subsidiary for defamation. 9 At issue was an allegedly defamatory article about the plaintiff, the President of Nauru,
published by the defendants in the Pacific Daily News, printed in

164. Id. at 1253 (footnote omitted).
165. 498 A.2d 605 (Md. 1985).
166. Id. at 608 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-305).

167. 83 F.R.D. 574 (D. Haw. 1979).
168. 719 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
169. DeRoburt, 83 F.R.D. at 575.
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Guam.17 0 In a case of first impression with respect to Hawaiian law,
the court was faced with differing lex loci delicti arguments as to what
nation's law to apply for defamation. 17 The plaintiff wanted to apply

Nauru law, as the place of greatest harm, which is similar to United
States libel law except that it does not include New York Times' actual
17
malice protections for defendants when plaintiff is a public figure.

The defendants wanted to apply either Guam law, the place of publication, or Hawaiian law both of which incorporate First Amendment protections.17 3 Defendants also contended that they had no business con74
nection to Nauru.1

In proceeding through an "interest-oriented" choice of law analysis, the court evaluated three factors: the relevant polices of the adjudicating forum, the justified expectations of the parties, and the place of
greatest harm.1 5 Under the first prong of the choice of law analysis,
the court concluded that First Amendment protections are paramount
to American public policy. 176 "It is a principle fundamental to our system of constitutional democracy 'that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.' ",77

Moving to the second prong, the court stated that defendants
could justifiably expect the application of First Amendment protections
because United States courts require its application. 7 81 However, this

does not exclude the application of Nauru law, as long as it is not in
conflict with the United States Constitution.

79

As there is no correla-

tion in Nauru law to the New York Times' "actual malice" standard,
there would be no conflict with Nauru law if the U.S. courts were to
apply the New York Times standard. 8 0 Therefore, defendants should
have expected application of Nauru law augmented by the New York
Times standard, not the application of an entirely different forum's
law, i.e., Guam's or Hawaii's.181

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id. at 576-77.
Id. at 577.
Id.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 578-81.
Id. at 579.
Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
Id. at 580.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Under the third prong, the court concluded that the place of greatest harm was Nauru, where the plaintiff was President of the country.182 As such, the court reached a very creative solution, holding "the
factors determinative of the interests of the parties in this case reveal
interests that would be best accommodated by the application of the
Nauru law of defamation subject to the limitations of the First Amendment." 18 3 This holding effectively guarantees First Amendment8 4 protection to all extraterritorial publications by American citizens.
About ten years later, an Illinois United States District Court was
faced with a similar issue in Desai v. Hersh.185 This suit was filed in an
American court by a citizen of India against the author of an allegedly
defamatory book entitled, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon
White House.18 6 The plaintiff wanted to apply Indian law to damages
incurred in India, while also pursuing a lawsuit in India. 187 However,
defendant claimed that applying Indian law, based on British common
law, is prohibited by the First Amendment.' 8 8
The court criticized DeRoburt in that it effectively applied American law, while claiming to apply the foreign law: "given the extensive
modifications resulting from the imposition of first amendment safeguards, under DeRoburt, the (first amendment) exceptions swallow up
the (foreign law) rule and the functional equivalent of American defamation law is applied."' 8 9
The court explicitly concluded that the First Amendment does not
apply to every extraterritorial publication printed by those protected
under the United States Constitution.1 90 The court then set out a purposeful abandonment test, whereby a writer or publisher will not be
protected i.e., if the material was published solely in a foreign country,
concerning activities of that country's public officials.' 9 ' A main concern was to prevent the First Amendment from being transformed
"from a shield into a sword."'19
On the other hand, the court also refused to hold that the First

182. Id. at 581.

183. Id.
184. Id. at 580-81.
185.
954 F.2d
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

1989), affid on other grounds,
Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. I11.
1408 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 672.
Id. at 672, 676.
Id.at 672.
Id.at 675.
Id.at 676.
Id.
Id.
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Amendment never applies to foreign publications, as that would cause
a "chilling effect" on American speech. 193 Hoping to provide predictability yet not to stifle the American media, the court set forth a purposeful abandonment test as follows:
[I]n instances where the plaintiff is a public official or figure
and thus heightened first amendment protections, including the
"actual malice" standard, apply to domestic publication, these
same protections will apply to extraterritorial publication of the
same speech where the speech is of a matter of public concern
and the publisher has not intentionally and directly published
the speech in the foreign country in a manner consistent with
1 94
the intention to abandon first amendment protections.
The court tried to limit the choice of law decision to actions within a
potential libel defendant's control, stating that there must be direct,
intentional international publication in order to abandon constitutional
protections.1 95 Conversely, "fain author or publisher who does not directly publish in a foreign country can rely on the protections of New
York Times."'196
More recently, almost the exact same issue faced in Matusevitch
was presented in Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications,Inc.197 Like
Matusevitch, this was a case of first impression for New York, requesting enforcement of a £40,000 British libel judgment by motion for
summary judgment."'
The case originated when a London reporter wrote a story (later
held to be defamatory by the High Court of Justice in London) which
defendant wired to India for publication in local newspapers. 99 The
story was then published in the Defendant's New York newspaper, "India Abroad," and also distributed in the United Kingdom."'
Like the Maryland court in Matusevitch, the New York court
highlighted four crucial differences between British and American libel
law: (1) the shifting of the burden of proof; (2) the lack of a distinction
between public and private figures; (3) the lack of a requirement that

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Id. at 680-81.
Id. at 681 (Supplemental Opinion).
Id. (Italicization added for conformity of style.)
585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
Id. at 661-62.
Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
Id.
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the allegedly defamatory statements be false; and (4) the lack of an
actual malice requirement with respect to public figures.20 1 After analyzing these differences, the court concluded that the defendant was not
afforded United States Constitutional First Amendment protections0 2
and that the absence of such safeguards would provide a "chilling effect" on American publications.20 8
In denying enforcement of the British judgment, the court evaluated the grounds for nonrecognition of foreign country judgments as set
forth in New York Civil Practice Law & Rules.20 4 Like Maryland,
New York's recognition statute states that a cause of action which is
repugnant to the state's public policy is a discretionary reason not to
recognize a foreign country's judgment.20 5
The Bachchan court ultimately agreed with the defendant that
such a judgment is repugnant to New York's public policy, stressing
that British libel law lacks First Amendment protections, and furthermore was specifically rejected by American law. 20 6 While clearly deciding the case on discretionary public policy grounds, the case went a
step further by holding that such a cause of action was mandatorily
unenforceable on constitutional grounds:
Similarly, if, as claimed by Defendant, the public policy to
which the foreign judgment is repugnant is embodied in the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution or the free
speech guaranty of the Constitution of this State, the refusal to
recognize the judgment should be, and it is deemed to be, "con20 7
stitutionally mandatory.
Like Maryland, New York's recognition statute provides mandatory
constitutional grounds for not recognizing a foreign country judgment,
including lack of due process of law or lack of personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. 20 8 While the Bachchan court held that a judgment rendered without First Amendment protections cannot be recognized in
New York, it was not clear under which statutory provision the court

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
Sup. Ct.
207.
208.

Id. at 663-64.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 664.
Id. at 662 (citing N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 5304).
Id. (citing N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 5304(b)(4)).
Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (N.Y.
1992).
Id. at 662.
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 5304(a) (McKinney 1995).
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based its conclusion. 20 9 The court briefly mentioned that a similar judgment would affect the core of due process, however the ultimate holding did not say there was such a violation. 10
Shortly after Bachchan was decided, a New York United States
District Court also dismissed a claim to apply British libel law in a
United States forum, but in a choice of law context. 11 Citing Bachchan, the District Court held that it "would be antithetical to the First
Amendment protections accorded the defendants," and hence dismissed
an alleged cause of action under British defamation law.21 2
V.

A.

ANALYSIS

Purposeful Abandonment

While freedom of speech is an underlying principle of American
democracy, it is not clear that it was judiciously invoked in Matusevitch. Matusevitch was living and working in England at the time
he published his article regarding another British resident who was a
limited public figure. Under Desai's purposeful abandonment test, Matusevitch had no reasonable expectations of American Constitutional
protections. Not only were both parties residing and working in England, the lex loci delicti - the place of greatest harm - and the judgment were all in England. Even if one did not apply a purposeful abandonment analysis, "when in Rome, do as the Romans do," or in this
case, "when in England, do as the English do."
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the defendant was forum
shopping when he filed suit in London. Again, both litigants were residents of and employed in England, the article was published in England and the most likely place of injury was in England. England was
clearly the most logical place to bring this defamation suit.
As stated in Tahan v. Hodgson, above, it is important that people
conducting business abroad respect the laws of that nation. Americans
cannot expect foreign countries to apply one law to its citizens and another to its visitors, or in this case former resident. Now that Matusevitch is being pursued for payment of the British judgment in the
United States, under no claims that the judgment is invalid, he is effec-

209. Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
210. Id.

211. Abdullah v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 1994 WL 419847, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
May 4, 1994). Note, however, that Matusevitch seemed to infer incorrectly that
Abdullah failed to "recognize a foreign libel judgment." Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877

F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1995) (emphasis added).
212. Abdullah, 1994 WL 419847, at *1.
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tively "transform[ing]
sword.""'3

the first amendment from a shield into a

B.

Public Policy

Whether or not Matusevitch was correctly decided, the case did
involve a pivotal American safeguard. While the threshold for finding a
clash with federal or state public policy is high, it is clearly crossed
where First Amendment protections of speech are lacking. Freedom of
speech is a fundamental tenet of our country, not a mere difference in
law. As such, British defamation law represents a direct confrontation
with American law. Not only are First Amendment safeguards for
speech different than British law, but they were adopted by this country in clear rejection of English law which was previously in force here.
Condoning British libel law by recognizing the judgment in Matusevitch would have offended America's sense of justice. Furthermore,
the United States would expose itself to legal arbitrage, with plaintiffs
shopping around the world for the most favorable forum, knowing they
could in turn enforce that judgment here even though they could never
have succeeded otherwise.
As suggested by both Bachchan and Matusevitch, such an affront
to the enshrined principles of American justice should not be recognized in the United States. Therefore, perhaps a foreign country judgment lacking in First Amendment protections should never be allowed
recognition, as Georgia and Massachusetts have done by statute. 1 4 If
rejection was mandatory, a case by case analysis of the facts and intentions of the parties would be irrelevant. As such, analysis of purposeful
abandonment or forum shopping would be unnecessary.
Furthermore, judgments that are repugnant to public policy and
judgments that lack other constitutional safeguards are not two mutually exclusive concepts. The two categories overlap and it is not always
easy to distinguish between them. It is somewhat arbitrary to make one
discretionary and one mandatory, as is done in most Recognition Acts
as adopted by the various states. Alternatively, judgments which offend
our constitutional protections, such as Matusevitch, could be classified
under mandatory due process provisions, leaving the public policy exception as only a last resort for those judgments not falling under any
other non-recognition exception.
In addition, a mandatory refusal to recognize a non-First Amend-

213. Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670, 676 (N.D. Il1. 1989).
214. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-114(6) (1995); MASS. GEN. LAws
§ 23A (West 1994).

ANN.
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ment libel judgment would more emphatically protect the American
press and provide more certainty among litigants and foreign nations.
While either the discretionary or the mandatory exception could produce the same result, classifying the Matusevitch issue under the
mandatory provision would lead to greater consistency and would allow
the American media to publish confident of full United States constitutional protections, even if living and working abroad, so long as there
were no exposed assets in the foreign jurisdiction. Reciprocally, however, Americans should expect foreign countries that lack First Amendment protections to reject American libel judgments.
While mandatory rejection of British libel law may be more emphatic, arguably the discretionary rejection of such a cause of action,
as in Maryland, would allow for a case by case evaluation of the circumstances. Although not applied in Matusevitch, this process would
also allow for evaluation of Desai's intent analysis. However, if both
Bachchan and Matusevitch voluntarily rejected British libel judgments
where the authors purposefully availed themselves of publication in the
foreign jurisdiction and purposefully abandoned American safeguards,
it is hard to imagine a case where a court would voluntarily recognize a
similarly obtained judgment. Courts also would need to resist showing
favoritism. As such, grounding the exception to recognition of a nonFirst Amendment foreign libel judgment in a mandatory form would be
more in keeping with the recent judicial trend.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Courts are faced with a precarious balancing act when called upon
to recognize and enforce a foreign country judgment that is rendered
without First Amendment protections. While wanting to maintain international harmony through notions of comity and certainty, we do
not want to force the American media to "chill" their speech to the
coolest foreign temperatures. Matusevitch, reinforcing Bachchan on a
federal level, continues to prevent recognition or enforcement of British
libel judgments on American shores as an affront to Maryland and
United States constitutional public policy. As such, Matusevitch reasserts the supremacy of the United States First Amendment over other
important international goals.
As we enter this rapidly advancing age of international communication, Matusevitch presents only one of many legal issues that will
need to be resolved. This author suggests that a blanket rejection of
such judgments would provide more certainty in the global arena.
Whether the United States ultimately tackles this problem through
multilateral treaties, federal law, or maintains the status quo, clearly
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this will be an area of burgeoning international concern with universal
implications.
Rachel B. Korsower

